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Abstract 
 
Purpose 
 
This paper intends to review the literatures on the technology catching-up trajectory of 
latecomers in order to understand the innovation strategies of Chinese Hi-Tech SMEs (Gu & 
Tse, 2010; Xie & White, 2006; Chen & Qu, 2003; Lee & Lim, 2001; Kim, 1997). It also tries 
to construct an integrated framework to investigate their innovation strategies and the impact 
on organizational performance from the Industry-, Resource-, and Institution-based view 
(Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008).   
Design/methodology/approach 
The authors have reviewed papers published in the leading journals in the R&D field and 
proposed an integrated conceptual framework of innovation strategies of Chinese Hi-Tech 
firms based on Peng, Wang and Jiang (2008)‟s institution-based view framework to examine 
the innovation strategy from Industry-, firm-specific Resource-based, and Institution-based 
View 
Originality/Value 
This paper pays attention to the institution factors in shaping Chinese SMEs to develop 
innovative capabilities. Chinese firms have comparative advantages, such as better 
comprehending Chinese local market, better understanding of local business environment 
comparing to MNEs. Our paper argues that by developing effective innovation strategies and 
improving innovative capabilities, Chinese SMEs will be able to survive from the severe 
competitions from state-owned enterprises and foreign firms in China.  
Keywords: Resource-based View, Institution-based View, Chinese Hi-Tech SMEs, 
Innovation 
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Introduction 
The topic of technology catching-up has been received attentions in recent decades. Many 
studies have specifically focused on the trajectory of successful technology catching-up in the 
industrialisation of developing countries (Lall, 1992; Bell & Pavitt, 1993; Hobday, 1995, 
1998; Kim, 1997; Lee & Lim, 2001; Mathews, 2002). It is believed that latecomer firms from 
newly industrialised economies (NIEs) (e.g. Korea) initially rely on importing mature 
technology from developed countries, and then build and accumulate their own technological 
capabilities (Hobday, 1995, 1998; Kim, 1997). Nevertheless, some researchers argue that 
Chinese companies will be likely to create its pathway to produce high value-added product 
and service innovations to continue its fast economic growth rather than to continue to adopt 
its low cost strategy (Porter, 1998; Gu & Tse, 2010) and/or rely on imitation strategy (Xie & 
White, 2006; Chen & Qu, 2003). China‟s huge domestic market has provided ample room for 
Chinese indigenous firms to entry and expansion in many industries without the need to 
immediately entail penetrating into global market (Xie, 2004; Xie & Wu, 2003; Brandt & 
Thun, 2010). It should be noted that less attention has been paid to the heterogeneities of 
Chinese small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the catching up process. Facing 
competition from large sized firms of Chinese domestic market and Multi-national 
enterprises (MNEs) from developed markets, it is momentous to improve innovative 
capabilities of Chinese high-tech SMEs. Additionally, it may be necessary to pay attention to 
the impact of the role of institutions to Chinese SMEs‟ innovative behaviour.  
Despite the efforts by researchers in explaining latecomer firms catching-up literature, most 
have assumed institutions as „background‟ (Peng et al., 2008; Gao et al., 2010). Indeed, as 
institutions in emerging economies in the context of China differ drastically from those in 
developed countries (Seligman, 1999; Shenkar, 2005) and significantly formulate firm‟s 
innovation strategies, omitting institutional environments in investigating the drivers of 
innovative behaviours and performance has seriously limited our understanding of Chinese 
high-tech SMEs‟ catching-up strategy (Gao et al., 2010). Thus, drawing on Peng et al. 
(2008)‟s “Strategy Tripod” framework, this paper provides a thorough review on the 
technology catching-up trajectory of Chinese Hi-Tech SMEs from Industry-, Resource-, and 
Institution-based perspective.  
In this paper, we begin with a review of existing literature in Chinese firms‟ technology 
catching-up, and identify our research gap. After that, we review the general development of 
Chinese SMEs. Following this, we will separately review the literature from industry-, 
resource-, and institution-based perspective to suggest an integrated theoretical model for 
illustrating the impact of innovation strategy to firm performance in Chinese high-tech SMEs. 
 
Early work relating Catching-up to Chinese firms 
Several studies have been carried out to analyze the processes of catching-up in Chinese 
firms (see table 1). Most of the studies focus on examining the effects of internal factors on 
firm‟s technology catching-up process rather than the effects of external factors. In particular, 
institutional environment factors have mostly been neglected in the extant latecomer‟s 
catching-up literature although firm‟s strategic choice directly has been influenced by 
institutional factors in emerging economies (Peng, 2003; Peng et al., 2008; Gao et al., 2010). 
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Furthermore, as majority of these empirical studies placed their attention to the large-sized 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or quasi-SOEs (e.g. town and village enterprises), it is likely 
that most can secure government financial and/or legitimate support easily. However, there is 
a lack of research on examining the technology catching-up trajectory of Chinese SMEs from 
„tripod strategy‟ perspective (Peng et al., 2008, 2009).  
Table 1 A summary of studies of the trajectory of Chinese firm‟s catching-up. 
Studies Sample Key findings 
Chen & Qu (2003) Qualitative analysis; 
Single case study of 
ZDZK Automation 
Ltd Co.  
1. Korea‟s model of technology catching-up may 
not meet the needs of China nowadays. 
2. Chinese firms that already possess a certain 
technological capability can and should 
circumvent the lower stages of the traditional 
model. 
Xie (2004) Qualitative analysis; 
Case studies of 
Chinese colour TV 
(CTV) industry. 
1. Despite China‟s CTV industry relied mainly    
upon the purchase of imported-technology, it can 
combine marketing skills for focusing its attention 
on the huge domestic market for a long time. 
2. latecomer firms in developing countries should 
view the industrial development from a global 
perspective, rather than seeking complete 
localization of components 
Mu & Lee (2005) Qualitative analysis; 
case studies Chinese 
telecommunication 
industry 
1. It finds that the extent to which catch-up hinges 
on the prior technological capabilities and the 
nature of arranged access to knowledge and terms 
of transfer.  
2. China can take advantage of its large market to 
enable technology transfer through joint venture 
with foreign MNEs from developed countries. 
3. The indigenous Chinese firms were able to 
secure their competitive advantage by satisfying 
different demands in the segmented markets. 
Fan (2006) Case study and 
simple regression 
analysis; survey data 
from China‟s 
telecom-equipment 
industry (note: Four 
large-sized firms)  
1. It finds that innovation capability and self-
developed technologies have been the key to 
leading domestic firms‟ catching up with the 
multinationals.  
2. It emphasizes that domestic firms should 
prioritize in-house R&D to build innovation 
capability from the very beginning, supplemented 
with external alliances. 
(Lee, Cho, & Jin) 
2009 
Qualitative analysis; 
case studies of 
1. Chinese indigenous automakers have been 
making a quick catch-up upon entry because the 
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mobile phones and 
automobiles sectors 
in China 
auto sectors tend to feature a higher degree of 
embodied technical change and increasing 
modularity in many components. 
2. Chinese domestic mobile phones makers can 
achieve early catch-up owing to the high 
modularity of production and availability of 
knowledge pool around the nation. 
 
Development of Chinese Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) 
Over the past three decades, Chinese SMEs have developed quickly due to the development 
of China‟s reform and opening-up. According to Chen‟s research (2006), there are roughly 
three development periods that Chinese SMEs have experienced. They are as follows: 
1. 1978-1992: the quickly expansion of SMEs in number and scale is resulted from the 
government‟s stimulation of and support for the development of township, collective 
and self-employed companies. 
2. 1992-2002: the government adopted different measures to reconfigure state-owned 
SMEs for gradually reducing the state‟s ownership in SMEs and the rapid 
development of non-public sectors due to establishment of the socialist market 
economy. 
3. 2002-on going: China promulgated the small and medium-sized enterprises promotion 
law in 2002 and amended the constitution to grant the non-public economy a legal 
status in the socialist market economy in 2004. 
Particularly Chinese SMEs have become the driving force for the dissemination and 
application of existing new technology and innovation. However, their expenditures on 
research and innovation are very limited (Chen, 2006; Wang & Yao, 2002). It may be 
because SMEs generally lack the resources (e.g. human, legitimate or financial resources) for 
innovation although they are flexible in responding to market signals (Wang & Yao, 2002). 
They also face severe competition and challenges from state-owned and foreign firms. For 
instance, state-owned commercial banks still regard state-owned firms and publicly-owned 
companies as the main candidates for loans for innovation and development (Wang, 2004). It 
should also be noted that more than 60 percent of the Fortune 500 companies have 
established operations in China by 2001, most with the intention of serving the domestic 
market by taking advantage of their advanced technology (Xie & White, 2006) Thus, it is 
imperative for Chinese SMEs to build „suitable‟ innovation strategy to survive in this intense 
competition. 
Theoretical Framework and background: ‘Strategy Tripod’ Framework 
Industry-based view: 
The industry-based view, pioneered by Porter (1980), emphasises how to attain a dominant 
position by interacting between firm and its environment. It maintains that both the strategy 
of firms and performances hinges on the structure of industry. According to Porter (1980), 
5 
 
firms can identify and defend themselves against all external environmental threats in the 
industry. In other words, the external environment in which a firm operates puts pressures on 
firm to adapt to survive and prosper (Collis, 1991). Firms can manage their dependence by 
formulating and implementing competitive advantages in an attempt to alter their position in 
the industry vis-à-vis competitors and suppliers (Gao et al., 2010). Consequently, industry 
factors are important to determine and limit a firm‟s strategic behaviour (Teece et al., 1997).  
Nevertheless, industry-based view has been criticised by scholars such as Wernefelt (1989), 
Rumelt (1991) and Caloghirou et al. (2004). The reason for this is that it has been needed to 
account for a firm‟s performance from firm-specific factors rather than the industrial effects. 
In this paper, by focusing on China‟s domestic market, we identify and propose three aspects 
are important, namely competition intensity, industry turbulence and industrial development 
orientation. 
 Competition intensity 
Competition-related factors such as industry concentration and barriers to entry have been 
recognised as important determinants of innovation in the literature (Dijk et al., 1997; Kraft, 
1989; Salavou et al., 2004). Additionally, much empirical evidence from the existing 
literature suggests that firms‟ innovative behaviour is affected by external competitive 
pressure (Salavou et al., 2004; Kamien & Schwarts, 1982; Fritz, 1989; Abernathy & 
Utterback, 1978). For instance, Kamien and Schwarts (1982) argue that intense competition 
may hinder firms‟ innovative activities, as fierce competition likely remove incentives to 
innovate. The intense competition combined with internally financial pressure will force 
firms to focus more on marketing performance in a short term rather than on innovation for 
the long-term benefits. In contrast to this type of reasoning, it can also be argued that 
competition provides condition and motivation for innovation (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980). 
It should be noted that prior literature about the development of Chinese SMEs in the 1980s 
is mainly focusing on labour intensive industries, such as textile, garment, leather, furniture, 
plastic products and durable consumer goods (Lin, Cai, & Li, 1994; Lin & Yao, 1998). It can 
be partly explained that China pursued the heavy industry-orientated development strategy 
prior to the 1980s so that this gave SMEs a perfect opportunity to fill the un-addressed market 
gap (Wang & Yao, 2002). As abundant and cheap labour resources in China, SMEs can build 
their competitive advantages by adopting low cost strategy. However, since the 1990s China 
has been much more open to foreign direct investment (FDI), many foreign MNEs from 
developed countries penetrated into Chinese market by exploiting their advanced technology. 
These foreign MNEs occupied Chinese high-end market quickly, where consumers are more 
sensitive to quality rather than price (Brandt & Thun, 2010). According to the research of 
Ghemawat and Hout (2008), foreign MNEs gained market leadership in China in every 
industry in which the ratio of R&D intensity to sales is greater than 8%. This embraces of 
packaged software, mobile phones, semiconductors and semiconductor equipment, advanced 
consumer electronics, mobile phones, photographic equipment, carbonated beverages and 
personal care (Brandt & Thun, 2010). Arguably, foreign MNEs still have dominated sectors 
which are technology and capital-intensive as well as needing sophisticated knowledge about 
marketing, branding and distribution. Thus, it is notable to observe to what extent Chinese 
SMEs do survive in and growth in this high-tech sector, where they are facing both foreign 
MNEs and SOEs‟ pressure in the competition. 
 Industry turbulence (demand uncertainty & technological turbulence) 
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Domestic industry turbulence can have a direct effect on Chinese SMEs‟ innovation strategy 
formulation. According to Voss and Voss (2000)‟s research, different market forces can be 
put into three main categories: demand, competitive and supply characteristics. Of these, 
there are tree most fundamental ones relating to firms‟ innovation strategy, namely demand 
uncertainty, technological turbulence because they represent the influence of customers and 
technology on the market (Li & Calantone, 1998). Demand uncertainty refers to the diversity 
and unpredictability of customer preferences and expectations (Gatignon & Xuereb, 1997; 
Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; Zhou, 2006). If customer demand is relatively stable, firms likely 
tend to achieve superior performance by making sizable investment in production capacity 
with aim of scale of economies (Kerin et al., 1992). However, if customer need is highly fluid 
and fast changing, it arguably can be seen as a kind of motivation for firms to pay more 
attention on innovation due to efforts to differentiate products. It also should be noted that 
identifying customer‟s changing demand will be much more difficult at the same time 
(Golder & Tellis, 1993). Thus, it is likely that firms will not spend their time and resources on 
innovation to avoid possible failures in market. Rather, firms may adopt imitation strategy 
and watch the other competitors, and then initiate their activities only after the signs of 
market potential are clear (Zhou, 2006). Technological turbulence refers to the rate and speed 
of technological change within an industry (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). An important aspect 
that benefits innovating firms is „first mover‟ advantage. As summarised by Gu and Tse 
(2010), research has shown first-mover advantages in the form of competition pre-emption 
through the monopoly of superior resources (Wernerfelf, 1984; Barney, 1991), such as R&D 
and patent races based on existing technologies (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). However, 
early entrants are likely unwilling to cannibalise their existing product lines, because they 
have invested substantially in their existing technological assets (Lieberman & Montgomery, 
1998).  
More and more foreign MNEs are now operating in China today. It is believed that these 
MNEs are enjoying „first mover‟ advantage due to their advanced technology. In the 
meantime, the needs of Chinese customers are becoming more complicated and product and 
service diffractions are required due to economic liberalisations and the development of 
Chinese market. However, it seems to be difficult for foreign MNEs to flexibly satisfy 
Chinese consumers demand due to their standard production procedure, especially when the 
local market is only a small portion of their portfolio (Brandt &Thun, 2010). From this 
perspective, Chinese domestic firms have better understanding of their domestic market and 
possess advantages comparing to foreign competitors. Conversely, Chinese SMEs grew 
outside the plan, unlike SOEs, they are more sensitive to market discipline and will be better 
attuned to consumer preference (Wang & Yao, 2002; Brandt & Thun, 2010). 
 
Firm Resource-based View (RBV): 
The RBV suggests that a firm can gain competitive advantage to compete and win within the 
same industry by means of possessing and deploying its valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable resources (Barney, 1991). According to the RBV, firms‟ superior performance 
hinges on the efficiency of resources and competences rather than relies on product-market 
positioning (Teece et al., 1997). It should point out that Penrose‟s argument (1959) is the 
basis of the RBV heterogeneity of resources. Penrose (1959:24) stated that: „the firm is more 
than an administrative unit; it is a collection of productive resources the disposal of which, 
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between different users, and over time, is determined by administrative decisions‟. Wernerfelt 
(1984) then defines the firm‟s resource as tangible and intangible assets and examines the 
relationship between resources and firm performance in terms of profitability. Barney (1991), 
based on the prior work related to RBV, argued that firms achieve competitive advantage by 
„implementing strategies that exploit their internal strength through responding to the 
environmental opportunities while neutralizing the external threats and avoiding internal 
weaknesses‟. As far as resources and capabilities concerned, firms are heterogeneous because 
they are endowed with distinctive abilities to accumulate, develop and deploy those tangible 
and intangible assets to shape and implement value creating strategies (Amit and Schoemaker, 
1993; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Caloghirou et al., 2004). 
Despite the RBV is an important framework for accounting for firm superior performance, it 
has been criticised as conceptually vague and tautological (Porter, 1991; William, 1991; 
Mosakowski & McKelvey, 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Priem & Butler, 2001; 
Bromiley & Fleming, 2002). As argued by Porter (1994), „at its worst, the resource-based 
view is circular. Successful firms are successful because they have unique resources. They 
should nurture these resources to be successful. But what is a unique resource? What makes it 
valuable?‟ thus, simply possessing idiosyncratic resources does not make a firm attain 
competitive advantage. Capabilities are likely to enable firm to coordinate activities by 
deploying its assets advantageously (Day, 1994; Zou et al., 2003).  
Based on RBV, internal resources drive firm‟s innovative activities, which in turn affect 
firm‟s performance. In this paper, we will examine Chinese SMEs‟ absorptive capacities, 
talent capacities, ownership structure, and linkage capability. 
 Absorptive capabilities 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) defined absorptive capacity as prior-related knowledge, 
including knowledge of the most recent scientific or technological developments, that confers 
an ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate and internalize it, and then 
apply it to commercial ends. Absorptive capacity is a function of prior-related knowledge is 
the idea that acquiring knowledge is most effective when the target knowledge is related to 
what is already known (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). That is, acquisition of new knowledge 
from external sources tends to be more successful when a firm possesses existing knowledge 
related to the new knowledge being acquired. And, internal transfer of the acquired 
knowledge tends to be more efficient when the recipient unit of the firm possesses prior 
knowledge related to the knowledge being transferred. Several researchers (Hamel, 1991; 
Inkpen, 2000; Lyles and Salk, 1996) have focused on the ability of firms to learn and they 
have suggested that the effectiveness of learning between organisational units is closely 
related to Cohen and Levinthal‟s (1990) notion of absorptive capacity (also see Chen & 
Hatzakis, 2008). In general, Chinese firms are facing the problem of lacking advanced 
technology which put them into a less competitive position in the competitive global market. 
As part of their internationalization strategy, technological catch-up will reduce their gap 
between their competitors form developed markets and help them to develop their 
independent R&D system. They have to find innovative ways to make space for themselves 
in markets that were already crowded with giant competitors, for instance, finding new ways 
to “complement” the strategies of the incumbents, such as through licensing new 
technologies, to forming joint ventures and strategic alliances (Mathews, 2002). It is plausible 
that it was through the implementation of these “complementary” strategies that latecomers 
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were able to win a place in the emergent global economy, not on the basis of their existing 
strengths, but on the basis of their capacity to leverage resources from the strengths of others, 
through making international connections (Melin, 1992). These internationalization strategies, 
designed to enhance firms‟ resource base rather than to exploit existing assets, represent a 
fundamental departure in thinking by firms about what “globalizing” means and how it can 
be accomplished.  
 
According to Mathews (2002), the idea of a “latecomer” turning disadvantages into sources 
of advantage, was formulated most clearly by Gerschenkron (1962). Gerschenkron identified 
the role for state agencies to play (e.g. amassing capital and making it available for 
investment in large-scale plant, or reducing risks by public sector development) in helping 
latecomer nations to overcome their disadvantages and “catch up” with earlier leaders. The 
rise of East Asian countries, starting with Japan and then moving to encompass Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore, provides a more recent instance of Gerschenkron‟s theory. It is now 
recognized that these catching-up countries have behaved in classic “latecomer” fashion in 
utilizing state agencies to engineer their entry into export markets and then into high 
technology sectors.  
 
The sequence of technological development strategies in these countries follows a three-stage 
model – acquisition, assimilation, and improvement (Kim, 1997, P. 88).  Catching-up 
countries such as China normally acquire advanced technologies from industrially developed 
countries at the early stage of their industrialization. Lacking of R&D capability, domestic 
firms only develop production through the acquisition of assembly processes, production 
know-how, technical personnel, and components and parts. The implementation of 
transferred foreign technology to manufacture products becomes the only objective of these 
firms. Once the implementation is accomplished, production and product design technologies 
are quickly diffused within the country. With low labour cost and little pressure in the 
protected market, the operation is relatively inefficient (Kim, 1997, P. 88). Therefore, the 
technical emphasis is placed on manufacturing (engineering) and limited new product 
development rather than research.  Most firms from emerging markets have faced or are 
facing the situation at the moment. Firms in developed countries develop along a 
technological trajectory made up of three stages – fluid, transition, and specific (Utterback, 
1994).  Firms from the first tier of catching-up countries (regions) or  (e.g. Korea, Taiwan, 
and Singapore) that have successfully acquired, assimilated, and sometime improved 
imported technology may be able to repeat the process with higher-level technologies in the 
transition stage in developed countries, which is focused on process innovation.  At this stage, 
these firms become more competitive equipped with relatively improved R&D capabilities 
and low cost resource.  Lee and Lim‟s (2001) built a model of technological and market 
catching-up to explain the evolution of selected industries in Korea, which introduced the 
idea of technological regime to the context of technological catch-up by the late-comer firms 
to derive a model of technological and market catch-up. Applying the Neo-Schumpeterian 
concept of the technological regime (Breschi et al., 2000) to the context of catch-up 
economies, they argue that technological regimes of the industries are important elements in 
catch-up by late-comer firms.  
 
 Talent Capacities 
 
Based on the resource-based theory, human capital and organisational structure can be seen 
as firm‟s resources (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984; Pierce & Delbecq, 1977). Given 
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China‟s distinctive domestic market and cultural environment, it is necessary that building an 
innovative organisation to engage in innovative activities adding new value to the Chinese 
consumers (Gu & Tse, 2010). Gu and Tse (2010) extend the conceptualisation of „exploration 
and exploitation‟ (March, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988) and argue that China is entrenched in 
the paradigm of execution and its two-tier talent structure lacks an extensive pool of middle-
level talent.  It should be mentioned that other researches also notice this lack of mid-layer 
labour market phenomenon. For example, a recent McKinsey global labour market report 
written by Farrell and Grant in 2005 argues that only 10% of Chinese engineers are 
competent enough to compete in the global outsourcing arena. In particular, George Gilboy‟s 
article in Foreign Affairs (August, 2004) argues that Chinese firms lack necessary capabilities 
to effectively support the commercialisation of an innovative idea. This to some extent 
reflects the lack of mid-level managers that has a broad vision to implement an innovative 
strategy (Gu & Tse, 2010).  
 
It needs to point out that „returnees‟ (those who have studied or had working experiences 
outside China before going back to the country to work and live), on one hand, play an 
important role in transferring core technological competence from abroad (Kim, 1997; 
Saxenian, 2002; Sternberg & Muller, 2005). On the other hand, china has developed a large 
pool of entry-level „raw talent‟ at the same time (Gu & Tse, 2010). Thus the fact is the top-
level (i.e., senior executives) supervises and guides the innovation of new integration by 
orchestrating the combination of novel and existing component innovations, while the 
bottom-tier employees are entirely engaged in implementation (Gu & Tse, 2010). Thus by 
means of apprenticeship type of training, Chinese firms are likely to build a competent 
middle tier which plays a key role in comprehensively connecting top and bottom level to 
enhance their innovative capabilities which are conducive to capitalising the innovative idea. 
 Ownership Structure 
Prior research on ownership structure have primarily focused on advanced economies and 
mainly examine how ownership structure influences a firm‟s strategy and performance (Hill 
& Snell, 1989; Tuschke & Sanders, 2003; Zahra et al., 2000). Nevertheless, ever since central 
governments commenced to launch their reforms of corporate governance and strategically 
motivate privatization, ownership structure in emerging economies has received increasingly 
more attention from scholars (Peng, 2004; Liu et al., 2010). Peng (2003) argues that 
ownership structure plays a particularly vital role in impacting on organisational routines and 
determining the firm‟s strategic orientations. For instance, Peng et al.(2004) note that various 
ownership can result in different managerial outlook as well as mindset.  It can be explained 
that firms from emerging market are generally characterised by large shareholdings in the 
hands of family and state (or government) in the context of China (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; 
Young et al., 2008). SMEs in emerging economies such as China, especially in the absence of 
effective formal institutional and financial support, often lack the ability to reduce contextual 
uncertainties and risks (Young et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2010). It is arguably that SMEs tend to 
pursue steady profits for survival rather than adventuring with risks according to previous 
research (Zahra, 1996). It can be seen as to some degree jeopardizing the firm‟s innovation 
capability because the firm is possibly to conduct business more conservatively.  However, 
Pent et al.(2004) find that SOEs and privately-owned enterprises (POEs) tend to adopt 
defender and prospector strategies, respectively. For example, Wang and Yao note that 
Chinese small companies spent a larger portion of technological expenditures on R&D than 
large firms (2002). They also find that most of the spending by large firms was used to 
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increase their production capabilities, whereas small firms ware more concentrating on how 
to absorb new technology and transform the technology into marketable products. 
 Linkage Capability 
Linkage (or network) is directly affecting Chinese SMEs to obtain new technology and 
enhance their innovative capability. According to Mathew‟s research (2006), the critical 
starting point for the latecomer firms is that it is focused not on its own advantages, but on 
the advantages which can be acquired externally (i.e. on resources which can be accessed 
outside of itself).Wang and Yao (2005) argues that as Chinese SMEs do not have sufficient 
capacities to conduct their own innovation (in-house innovation), they are more possibility to 
purchase or acquire technologies from outside sources than large firms are. For instance, the 
Development Research Center (DRC), the State Statistical Bureau (SSB) and the Ministry of 
Sciences and Technologies (MST) study support this argument.   
The most important channel for SMEs to acquire technology is to cooperate with an outside 
source. This can take several forms: acting as a supplier for a large firm, cooperating with a 
research institute or a university, forming a joint venture with a foreign firm, and cooperating 
with other SMEs (Wang & Yao, 2002). Gu and Lundvall (2006) argue that Chinese reforms 
have led to a system that is oriented more to international markets than to local and domestic 
ones. Foreign firms dominate the export sectors so it is inevitable that they would develop, 
and governments would encourage, linkages with and among the international firms 
(including their joint venture partners). But this emphasis proved costly for local firms in that 
similar linkage within the domestic sector were not developed. „In general potential local or 
domestic links along and between value chains have been slow to develop and hard to 
expand‟ (Gu & Lundvall, 2006). 
 
Institution-based view 
Defined as „the rules of the game‟ (North, 1990), institutions significantly put legitimacy 
pressures for firms and directly affect firms‟ strategic choices and performance consequences 
(Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Peng, 2003; Peng et al., 2008, 2009; Wright et al., 
2005; Gao et al., 2010). This view is built on the ground of institutional theory (North, 1990; 
Scott, 1995; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Scott (1995) defines three pillars of the institutional 
theory: regulative, cognitive and normative. The key is that through these institutional 
coercive, mimetic and normative pressures „organisational characteristics are modified in the 
direction of increasing compatibility with environmental characteristics‟ (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983, p.149). 
Both the industry- and resource-based view are criticized for largely ignoring the formal and 
informal institutional underpinning that offers the context of competition among industries 
and firms studied with these lenses (Kogut, 2003; Peng et al., 2008). It is understandable to 
treat institution as background, because industry- and resource-based views arise primarily 
out of research on competition in the advanced economies such as the United States, in which 
it may seem reasonable to assume a relatively stable, market-based institutional framework 
(Peng et al., 2008). However, researchers increasingly find that institutions in emerging 
economies are significantly different from those in developed countries, which significantly 
11 
 
shape the strategy and performance of firms (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Wright, 
Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005; Doh et al., 2004; Lu et al., 2008, Chacar & Vissa, 
2005; Hafsi & Farashahi, 2005). Thus, according to Peng (2003, 2006) and Peng et al. (2008, 
2009), institutions should be treated as independent variables rather than the background and 
an institution-based view of strategy places attention to the dynamic interaction between 
institutions and firms, and considers strategic choices as the outcome of such an interaction in 
emerging economies. In other words, institution „directly determines what arrows a firm has 
in its quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy and to create competitive 
advantage‟ (Ingram & Silverman, 2002).  
It is also interesting to find out that some previous research, emphasizing the role of the 
government policies, tries to bridge institutional theories with latecomer firms‟ catching up 
(Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997). For example, Kim (1997) argued that the government‟s 
intellectual property regime in Korea was supportive of the local firms by giving them 
opportunities to imitate foreign MNEs during the early stages of catching up. Ning (2007) 
uses Taiwan as an example in his research, argued that Taiwan‟s government designed the 
polices to promote SMEs rather than stressing big business like Korea and limited private 
investment capital and the different governing ideologies. However there are few studies to 
examine Chinese firms catching up from institution-based perspective. 
Thus it is imperative to include the institutional environment when investigating firms‟ 
innovation strategy and performance in an emerging economy in the context of China. In this 
paper, we have reviewed the extant literature from both formal and informal perspective. 
1. Formal institution factors 
(1) Government policy to encourage innovation 
It should be noted that the latest plan specifically stresses the need to enhance capabilities for 
„indigenous‟ or „domestic-grown innovation‟, with an aim to establish the necessary 
infrastructure for a leadership position in a number of S&T-based sectors (Hutschenreiter & 
Zhang, 2007).  
One of the main goals of the 11
th
 Five-Year Program (2006-2010) adopted in 2006 is 
„scientific development and a determined emphasis to encourage „an innovation-orientated 
nation‟ (Dobson & Safarian, 2008): 
‘In the 11th Five-Year Program period, we will implement the strategy of rejuvenating our 
nation through science and education and take science and technology advancement and 
innovation as a major driving force of economic and social development. We will give more 
strategic importance to developing education and fostering high-quality talented people who 
are endowed with capability and integrity, deepen system reforms, increase input, accelerate 
the development of science, technology and education, and make great efforts to build an 
innovation-oriented nation and strong nation with abundant human resources (Government 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2006a).’ 
It is also necessary to highlight that China recently has announced „Medium to Long Term 
Science and Technology Development Plan, 2006-2010‟ to institutionally enhance China‟s 
national innovation infrastructure. The goal is that China becomes an „innovation-oriented‟ 
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nation by the year 2020 and will become a leading innovative economy in the world in the 
future (Hutschenreiter & Zhang, 2007). It broadly has two aims: (1) to raise R&D intensity to 
the current OECD average by 2020 (increasing spending as a share of GDP from 1.3% to 
2.5%; and (2) targets for particular sectors „to reduce sharply reliance on imported 
technology, obtain advanced core technologies in the equipment manufacturing and the 
information industry, increase agriculture productivity and ensure national food safety, make 
a breakthrough in energy development, energy saving technology and clean energy 
technology and build several world-class science and research institutions and university and 
form a system for innovation that is characteristic of China‟. (State Council, Government of 
the People‟s Republic of China, 2006b; also see Dobson & Safarian, 2008). 
Furthermore, Chinese government continuously increased direct support to S&T activities. 
For example, central government set up its strategy as attracting the financial investment 
from local government and enterprises, evidenced by the funding structure of „Spark 
Program‟, the „863 Program‟ and „973 Program‟ (Huang et al., 2004). Additionally, Chinese 
government has set up many science parks and technology and business incubators. 
According to Torch Program‟s statistics data, the output value from the 53 high-tech science 
parks in 2001 already dominated in the gross output value of high-tech sector across the 
country (2004). It is also important that China Hi-Tech Fair (CHTF) now receives strong 
support from the central government to play a role of connecting Chinese and international 
high-tech industry sectors (Huang et al., 2004). One of the features of CHTF is that many 
overseas Chinese students have been actively participating in the even in every year, thus it 
can be as a mechanism to enhance Chinese human resource capacity too.  
(2) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
Since 1990s the issue of protection of IPR in China has been not only a national economic 
and juridical dilemma, but also a significant economic and political concern for a number of 
industry interest groups and governments in developed countries (Huang et al., 2004). 
Following its accession to the WTO, China is obliged to bring the protection of IPR 
according to the WTO arrangement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). 
Clarke (2001) pointed out that stronger institutions and better protection of property rights 
encourage greater R&D expenditures in developing countries. Hout (2006) also notes how 
china‟s weak protection of intellectual property rights reduces the incentives to innovate. It is 
believed that as more Chinese domestic enterprises realize the value of IPR in the fierce 
competition against multinational giants with IPR advantage and the government‟s stronger 
promotion, patenting in China will improve in the near future. Apparently Chinese 
government has made efforts to build sound legal framework for IPR protection. For 
instance, in the S&T and innovation field, Science and Technology Development Law (1993) 
regulating high-tech industry development, Agriculture Technology Transfer Law (1993), 
Strengthen Technology Transfer Law (1996), Dissemination of Science and Technology 
Knowledge Law (2002) and Small and Medium Enterprises Promotion Law (2002) show the 
efforts of China‟s government on legislative actions. Thus, as Hutschenreiter and Zhang 
(2007) claimed, IPR protection not only affects the willingness of foreign partners to transfer 
technology to China, but also stimulate Chinese domestic enterprises to become more 
innovative.  
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2. Informal institution factors 
(1). Culture Norms 
Organisational culture is essential for firms to engage it innovation and creation (Johnson, 
1996; Judge et al., 1997; Pienaar, 1994; Shaughnessy, 1988; Leonard, 1995; Tesluk et al., 
1997; Tushman & O‟Reilly, 1997; Long, 1997; Holsapple and Joshi, 2001; Martins & 
Treblanche, 2003;). A few studies clearly investigate the impact of Chinese organisational 
culture to firm‟s innovation. Lu, Tsang and Peng (2008) use organisational cultures as one of 
internal factors to investigate the influence of the institutional environment on the firm‟s 
innovation strategy. Also, according to Gu and Tse‟s recent research on China‟s information 
and communication technology (ICT) industries (2010), they find that the professional 
cultures are labelled by a preference for short-term, tangible results over long-term, 
unpredictable but potentially radical hits, for low-cost and efficiency over differentiation, for 
taking on assigned tasks over „thinking outside of the box‟, for conforming to the norm over 
challenging the status quo, and for exploiting existing knowledge over generating new 
knowledge. Thus institutionalising the best knowledge sharing and creating practices into 
local business can create a „learning-by-doing‟ and „learning-by-apprenticeship training‟ 
environment within the organisation (Epple, Argote, & Murphy, 1996; Gu & Tse, 2010). 
Arguably, it is likely that Chinese organisational cultures hinder firms in their efforts to 
innovate, because the disadvantages of Chinese „following-order culture‟ and „short-term 
orientation‟ are not easily overcome. Nevertheless, it should be noted that some Chinese 
firms adopt knowledge-friendly culture can have a positive influence on firm‟s innovation 
outcomes. For example, Chen and Hatzakis (2008) find that creating a trusting and 
cooperative culture is essential for disseminating and creating new knowledge in Chinese 
SMEs. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate to what extent the unique Chinese 
institutionally-embedded cultures affect high-tech SMEs to shape their innovation strategies 
in their trajectory of technology catching up. 
(2).The role of Chinese government 
Governments have played important role in the high successful development of the East 
Asian economies such as Japan (Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997). Lau (1997) studied the role of 
government.  He has examined the functions of government, including „the design and 
maintenance of the economic environment, the regulation of the economy, the enforcement of 
laws and contracts, and the provision of public goods such as infrastructure and education‟. 
Following Lau (1997)‟s work, this paper focuses on the involvement of government in 
supporting firms‟ R&D and innovation activities, whether directly through government 
laboratories, or indirectly by financially supporting R&D projects at universities and in 
private industry, can also be viewed as an attempt to create comparative advantage. However, 
a number of researchers argue that governments‟ inappropriate polices negatively influence 
the incentives for Chinese firms. For instance, Kroeber (2006) argues Chinese government 
policies failed to recognise the importance of incremental innovation. Hout (2006) also 
claims that the incentive structure for technology-based innovation is shaped by firms in the 
private sector responding to market signal rather than government policy or funding. Gu and 
Lundvall (2006) argue that reforms seem to result in a inclination that is oriented more to 
overseas markets than to domestic market. These preferences for international markets may 
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encourage learning in export-orientated firms but can weaken innovate on their own (Dobson 
& Safarian, 2008).  
Li (1998) argued that institutional factors will determine the performance of Chinese SMEs. 
Although gradually reducing its intervention in SMEs, to certain extent, Chinese government 
still interferes firms‟ business activities by setting the institutional determinants (Roy et al., 
2001; Tan, 2001) and making policies that continue to encourage distorted firm behaviours 
such as concentrating on government-guided production only (Roy, A., Walters & Luk, 
2001).  
 Chinese local governments have played a very important role in terms of encouraging and 
supporting the „exploration and exploitation‟ processes of these firms. Dobson and Safarian 
(2008) studies the enterprises in Zhejiang province and found that Zhejiang government has 
been supportive, market-friendly, investing transportation infrastructure and R&D and 
industrial parks, and providing common services, some project funding, and loan guarantees. 
Qian and Stiglitz (1996) state that the Chinese political system can be characterized as one of 
„M-form‟ hierarchy, that is, a multi-level, multi-regional organisation with multilayer 
structure along vertical lines and multiregional structure along horizontal lines (Qian and Xu, 
1993) and government at each level has considerable authority in formulating economic 
policies. They studied Guangdong provincial government as an example and concluded that 
the diminishing role of central government is the reason for Guangdong‟s success because the 
local government tends to intervene by using indirect rather than direct methods, which is an 
important part of the changing function of the government. Thus it can be argued that 
Chinese local government should be more flexible in terms of developing and adjusting the 
local development strategies and policies to support innovative activities of SMEs.  
 
Performance 
According to Gu and Tse‟ research (2010), in this paper we adopt their measures to gauge an 
organisation‟s innovation performance, namely the level of novelty of its innovation, degree 
of successful innovative ideas commoditisation and the growth of its research and 
development (R&D) team. The first two measures directly match the innovation dimensions 
given by Roberts (1988): „newness‟ and „commercialisation‟. According to the OSLO manual 
(OECD, 1992), the number of innovations alone is not a good indicator of innovation 
performance because they might be various across different industries. So it will be better to 
take into account of both number of inventions and the level of commercialisation of 
invention in the firm. For example, it may be worth observing the percentage calculated by 
dividing the number of inventions by the total number of products (Guan et al., 2009). We 
choose the third one aiming for capturing the trajectory of the development of organisation 
itself rather than adopt outcome-based measures such as market share because the majority of 
Chinese SMEs in high-tech sector are not publicly listed and very young (Gu & Tse, 2010). 
Thus, we endeavour to use the trajectory of R&D team/department as a proxy to investigate 
the building process in Chinese high-tech SMEs innovative capabilities. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed an integrated framework building upon Peng et al. (2008)‟s 
„tripod strategy‟ which examines technology catching-up trajectory of Chinese Hi-Tech 
SMEs from Industry-, Resource-, and Institutional-based view (See Figure 1 below).  
Figure 1: An Integrated Framework of Chinese SMEs’ Innovation Strategies (Adapted from Peng et al., 
2008) 
 
As industry- and resource-based views arise primarily out of research on competition in the 
advanced economies to assume a relatively stable, market-based institutional framework, the 
extant literatures are treating the institution as background or environment in which firms 
operates (Peng et al., 2008). More recently researchers increasingly found that the institutions 
of emerging economies significantly differ from those in developed countries. There are 
increasing appreciation that formal and informal institutions, commonly known as the „rules 
of the game‟, significantly shaped the strategy and performance of firms in emerging 
economies. Our paper has paid special attention to the institutional factors (formal & informal) 
in affecting Chinese SMEs to develop innovative capabilities. In this study, we also 
emphasize the role of Chinese local governments and find that they have developed flexible 
and supportive policies towards hi-tech SMEs to help and encourage them develop innovate 
capabilities. The institution-based view can be seen as a strong explanatory tool, above and 
beyond the industry- and resource-based theory, thus providing an integrated theoretical 
viewpoint for investigating Chinese firms‟ innovation strategy. It is also believed that 
Chinese domestic firms have comparative advantages, such as cheap labour resources, better 
knowledge about Chinese local market comparing to foreign MNEs from developed countries. 
Facing intense competition both from large-sized SOEs and foreign MNEs, Chinese SMEs 
should pay more attentions to indigenous innovation by taking advantage of Chinese huge 
domestic market. Our study concludes that by developing effective innovation strategies and 
improving innovative capabilities, Chinese SMEs will be able to survive from the severe 
competitions from state-owned enterprises and foreign firms.  
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